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Abstract—This letter investigates the problem of distributed
spectrum access for cognitive small cell networks. Compared
with existing work, two inherent features are considered: i) the
transmission of a cognitive small cell base station only interferes
with its neighbors due to the low power, i.e., the interference is
local, and ii) the channel state is time-varying due to fading.
We formulate the problem as a robust graphical game, and
prove that it is an ordinal potential game which has at least one
pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE). Also, the lower throughput
bound of NE solutions is analytically obtained. To cope with
the dynamic and incomplete information constraints, we propose
a distribute spectrum access algorithm to converge to some
stable results. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the
proposed game-theoretic distributed learning solution in time-
varying spectrum environment.
Index Terms—cognitive small cell networks, graphical game,
ordinal potential game, stochastic learning automata.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMALL cells have been regarded as a promising approachto meet the increasing traffic demand for 5G networks.
Compared with traditional cellular cells, small cells are char-
acterized by low-cost, low-power and short-range, and hence
increase the spectrum spatial reuse significantly. Due to the
dynamic and random deployment, centralized optimization
approaches are not feasible; instead, distributed and self-
organizing optimization approaches are preferable [1]. In this
context, it is now realized that enabling cognitive ability [2]
into small cells, which is refereed to as cognitive small cells
(CSCs) [3], [4], would further improve the resource utilization.
CSCs are able to sense and observe, learn from the past infor-
mation, make intelligent decisions, and adjust their operational
parameters such as access channels and transmitting power. In
this letter, we focus on the problem of distributed spectrum
access, which is vital for cognitive small cell networks [3].
To address the distributed and autonomous decision-making,
game theory [5] is a powerful tool and has been applied
in small cell networks, e.g., utility-based learning approach
[6], reinforcement-learning based self-organizing scheme [7],
coalitional game based scheme [8], evolutionary game based
scheme [9] and hierarchical dynamic game approach [10].
However, there are two limitations: i) the channel states are
assumed to be static, which is not always true since it is
actually time-varying in practical wireless environment, and
ii) it is assumed that the transmission of a small cell interferes
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with all other cells, i.e., the interference is global, which is
also not always true since a small cell actually only interferes
with its neighbors due to the low transmitting power, i.e., the
interference is local. Thus, it is timely and urgent to develop
efficient distributed spectrum access approaches for cognitive
small cell networks with local interference and time-varying
channel states.
Due to the structure of local interaction, it is not easy to
incorporate game models in wireless networks with local in-
teractions/interference. To overcome this challenge, some pre-
liminary progresses using graphical game have been achieved
for resource optimization in static wireless networks [11]–
[16]. Specifically, the local altruistic game that can achieve
global optimization via neighbor cooperation for opportunistic
spectrum access was proposed in our previous work [13],
the proprieties of atomic congestion games on graphs were
analyzed in [14], and graphical game models for MAC-
layer interference minimization were reported in [15], and a
graphical game model for dynamic spectrum sharing in TV
white space was studied in [16]. In methodology, these models
and solutions, which were originally designed for statistic
scenarios, can not be applied for the dynamic small cell
networks with time-varying channel states, which is interesting
and challenging.
In this letter, we formulate the problem of distributed
spectrum access in cognitive small cell networks as a robust
graphical game. It is proved that the formulated game is an
ordinal potential game which has at leat on pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (NE); in addition, the lower throughput bound of
any pure strategy NE is analytically derived. To cope with the
dynamic and incomplete information constraints, we propose a
stochastic learning automata based distributed spectrum access
algorithm, and prove its convergence towards pure strategy
NE. Simulation results show that the proposed game-theoretic
distributed solution achieves high throughput in time-varying
environment.
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model and problem formulation are presented. In
Section III, we formulate the robust graphical game, analyze
its properties in terms of the existence and throughput lower
bound of NE, and propose a distributed learning algorithm
to achieve desirable results. Finally, simulation results and
discussion are presented in Section IV, and conclusion is drawn
in Section V.
2II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System model
We consider a network consisting of N cognitive small
cell base stations (SBSs) and M channels. Each cognitive
SBS chooses the operational channel and the serving user
equipments sharing the channel using some multiple access
mechanisms. Thus, the task of distributed spectrum access is
performed by the SBSs. For presentation, we will use SBS
and user interchangeably in the rest of this letter. Denote the
user set as N , i.e., N = {1, . . . , N}, and the channel set as
M, i.e., M = {1, . . . ,M}.
Due to the dynamic and random deployment, it is not
feasible to use traditional centralized optimization approaches
to coordinate spectrum access for cognitive small cells. By
employing the great advances in cognitive radio technique,
sensing-based distributed spectrum access is desirable. A cog-
nitive SBS will access a channel if the received interference
from other SBSs is below a threshold [3]. With such a
spectrum access model, the transmission of a cognitive SBS
only directly affects its neighbors due to the low transmitting
power. Specifically, if the distance dij between user i and
j is lower than a threshold d0, they interfere with each
other when transmitting on the same channel. Therefore, the
potential interference relationship can be characterized by an
interference graph G = {V,E}, where V is the vertex set and
E is the edge set, i.e., V = {1, . . . , N} and E = {(i, j)|i ∈
N , j ∈ N , dij < d0}. Denote the neighboring user set of user
n as Jn, i.e., Jn = {j ∈ N : dnj < d0}.
The transmission rate of each channel is always time-
varying due to fading. To capture such fluctuations, the finite
rate channel model [17] is applied1. With the help of adaptive
modulating and coding (AMC), each channel can support a
certain set of discrete transmission rate under different channel
conditions. Specifically, the rate set of channel m is denoted
as Sm = {sm1, sm2, . . . , smK}, where smk indicates that the
channel can support certain transmission rate (packets/slot).
Without loss of generality, we assume sm1 < sm2 < . . . <
smK . The corresponding rate-state probabilities of channel
m are given by Πm = {pim1, . . . , pimK} and the expected
transmission rate is given by s¯m =
∑
k pimksmk. Note that
the instantaneous transmission rate of two channels in each
slot may be the same or different. Their expected values,
however, are assumed to be the same2, which implies that
we can denote the expected transmission rate of the channels
as s¯ = s¯m, ∀m ∈M.
B. Problem formulation
The task of each SBS is to choose an appropriate channel to
access. When more than one SBS chooses the same channel,
only one SBS can successfully access the channel since they
can hear the transmission of others [3], which is similar to
1It should be pointed out that the finite rate model is for the convince of
presentation and simulation. When other time-varying channel models applied,
the methodology and theoretical results obtained in this letter still hold.
2This assumption holds in most wireless networks. The channels in a
wireless network are generally in closed spectrum band, and hence have the
same transmission characteristic. Thus, their expected transmission rates are
the same.
the carrier-sense-multiple-access strategy. For presentation, we
assume that the overhead for resolving the contentions among
the users is negligible3. Denote an(k) as the chosen channel of
SBS n at slot k, then the instantaneous achievable transmission
rate of user n is determined by:
rn(k) =


san(k), w.p. 11+ ∑
j∈Jn
I(an,aj)
0, w.p. 1− 1
1+
∑
j∈Jn
I(an,aj)
,
(1)
where san(k) is the instantaneous transmission rate of channel
an in time k, Jn is the neighboring user set of n, and
I(an, an′) is the following indicator function:
I(an, ak) =
{
1, an = ak
0, an 6= ak
(2)
Note that the instantaneous transmission rate rn(k) is dynamic
and random, which is jointly determined by the current chan-
nel state and the channel selection profiles of the neighbors.
Based on (1), the expected achievable transmission rate of user
n is given by:
Rn = E[rn(k)] =
E[san ]
1 + cn
, (3)
where E[·] is the operation of taking expectation and
cn(a1, . . . , aN ) =
∑
k∈Jn
I(an, ak). (4)
Therefore, the system-centric optimization goal is to find
the optimal channel selection profile such that the aggregate
expected throughput is maximized, i.e.,
P1 : max
∑
n∈N
Rn (5)
It is known that information is key to decision-making
problems [18], and the information constraints arising in the
formulated optimization problem P1 are as follows:
• Dynamic: due to the dynamic features of wireless trans-
missions, the instantaneous channel rates in each slot are
not deterministic and time-varying.
• Incomplete: in the absence of centralized control, a user
does not know the action profiles of others; furthermore,
due to the fact that each user is equipped with a single
radio, the users only have information about the accessed
channel and do not know the states of other channels. In
addition, the users are unaware of the rate-state probabil-
ities of the channels.
III. ROBUST GRAPHICAL GAME AND DISTRIBUTED
LEARNING FOR DISTRIBUTED SPECTRUM ACCESS
Since there is no centralized controller and the SBS make
their decisions distributively and autonomously, we formu-
late the problem of distributed spectrum access as a non-
cooperative game. In the following, we present the formulated
game model, analyze its properties, and propose a stochastic
distributed learning algorithm to converge to stable solutions
in time-varying spectrum environment.
3It is emphasized that the analysis and results obtained in this letter can be
easily extended to other practical systems by multiplying a modified factor in
(1) and (3).
3A. Game model
Formally, the distributed spectrum access game model is
denoted as F = [N ,G, {An}n∈N , {un}n∈N ], where N =
{1, . . . , N} is a set of players (SBSs), G is the potential
interference graph among the users, An = {1, . . . ,M} is a set
of the available actions (channels) for each player n, and un is
the utility function of player n. In the considered problem, a
player is directly affected by its neighbors, which means that
the utility function can be expressed as un(an, aJn), where an
is the chosen action of player n and aJn is the action profiles
of the neighbouring users of n. Furthermore, it is noted from
(1) that the available transmission rates of the users are random
in a slot, and we define the utility function as the expected
achievable transmission rate, i.e.,
un(an, aJn) =
E[san ]
1 + cn
. (6)
It is seen that the utility function is defined over expectation,
and the interactions among the users are limited to neighboring
users. This is the exact reason why we call it robust graphical
game. Each player in a non-cooperative game intends to
maximize its individual utility, i.e.,
(F) : max
an∈An
un(an, aJn), ∀n ∈ N . (7)
B. Analysis of Nash equilibrium (NE)
In this subsection, we present some definitions in game
community and then investigate some important properties of
the formulated robust graphical game.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium [19]). A channel selection
profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ) is a pure strategy NE if and only if
no player can improve its utility by deviating unilaterally, i.e.,
un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥ un(an, a
∗
Jn), ∀n ∈ N , ∀an ∈ An, an 6= a
∗
n
(8)
Definition 2 (Ordinal potential game [19]). A game is
an ordinal potential game (OPG) if there exists an ordinal
potential function φ : A1 × · · · × AN → R such that for all
n ∈ N , all an ∈ An, and a′n ∈ An, the following holds:
un(an, aJ−n)− un(a′n, aJn) > 0
⇔ φ(an, aJn)− φ(a
′
n, aJn) > 0
(9)
That is, the change in the utility function caused by the
unilateral action change of an arbitrary each user has the same
trend with that in the ordinal potential function. It is known
that OPG admits the following two promising features: (i)
every OPG has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
and (ii) an action profile that maximizes the ordinal potential
function is also a Nash equilibrium.
The properties of the proposed robust graphical game are
characterized by the following theorems.
Theorem 1. The robust graphical game F is an OPG and
hence has at least one pure strategy.
Proof: To prove this theorem, we first construct an ordinal
potential function as follows:
Φ(an, a−n) = −
∑
n∈N
cn(a1, . . . , aN ), (10)
where cn is characterized by (4).
For presentation, denote In(an, aJn) as the set of neighbor-
ing users choosing the same channel with player n, i.e.,
In(an, aJn) = {k ∈ Jn : ak = an}, (11)
where Jn is the neighbor set of player n. Then, we have
cn =
∑
k∈Jn
I(an, ak) = |In(an, aJn)|, (12)
where I(an, ak) is the indicator function characterized by (2),
and |A| is the cardinality of set A, i.e., the number of elements
in |A|. If an arbitrary player n unilaterally changes its channel
selection from an to a∗n, then the set of neighboring users
choosing the same channel with player n after the unilateral
changing is In(a∗n, aJn). Therefore, the change in individual
utility function caused by this unilateral change is as follows:
un(a
∗
n, aJn)− un(an, aJn)
=
E[sa∗n ]
1+|In(a∗n,aJn )|
−
E[san ]
1+|In(an,aJn )|
(13)
Also, the change in the potential function caused by the
unilateral change of player n is as follows:
Φ(a∗n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n)
= |In(an, aJn)| − |In(a
∗
n, aJn)|
+
∑
k∈In(an,aJn )
[|Ik(ak, aJk)| − |Ik(ak, a
∗
Jk
)|]
+
∑
k∈In(a∗n,aJn )
[|Ik(ak, aJk)| − |Ik(ak, a
∗
Jk
)|]
+
∑
k∈K,k 6=n
[|Ik(ak, aJk)| − |Ik(a
∗
k, aJk)|],
(14)
where Ik(ak, a∗Jk) is the set of neighboring users choosing
the same channel with player n after unilaterally changing
the selection of player n. The set K = N\{In(an, aJn) ∪
In(a
∗
n, aJn)}, where A\B means that B is excluded from A,
denote the set of users not interfering with player n when it
chooses an and a∗n. Due to the local interactions among the
users, the following equations hold:
|Ik(ak, a
∗
Jk
)| − |Ik(ak, aJk)| = −1, ∀k ∈ In(an, aJn) (15)
|Ik(ak, a
∗
Jk
)| − |Ik(ak, aJk)| = 1, ∀k ∈ In(a
∗
n, aJn) (16)
|Ik(ak, aJk)| − |Ik(ak, a
∗
Jk
)| = 0, ∀k ∈ K, k 6= n (17)
Based on (14) – (17), we have
Φ(a∗n, a−n)−Φ(an, a−n) = 2
(
|In(an, aJn)| − |In(a
∗
n, aJn)|
)
(18)
Considering the fact that the expected transmission rates of
the channels are the same, equations (13) and (18) yield to the
following inequality:(
un(a
∗
n, aJn)− un(an, aJn)
)(
Φ(a∗n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n
)
=
2s¯
(
|In(an,aJn)|−|In(a
∗
n,aJn )|
)
2(
1+|In(a∗n,aJn )|
)(
1+|In(an,aJn )
) ≥ 0,
(19)
which satisfies the definition of OPG, as characterized by (9).
Thus, the formulated robust graphical game F is an OPG,
which has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
4Theorem 2. For any network topology, the aggregate achiev-
able transmission rate of all the users at any NE point is
bounded by U(aNE) ≥
∑
a∈N
s¯M
M+|Jn|
.
Proof: For any pure strategy NE aNE = (a∗1, . . . , a∗N), ac-
cording to the definition given in (8), the following inequality
holds for each user n, ∀n ∈ N :
un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥ un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn), ∀a¯n ∈ An, a¯n 6= a
∗
n, (20)
Summing the two-sides of (20) yields the following:
|An| × un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn
)
≥
∑
a¯n∈An
un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn), (21)
where |An| denotes the number of channels in the system, i.e.,
|An| =M . Then, equation (21) can be re-written as follows:
un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥
∑
a¯n∈An
un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn
)
M
. (22)
It is seen that
∑
a¯n∈An
un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn
) represents the aggre-
gated achievable transmission rates of player n as if it would
access all the channels simultaneously while the neighboring
users still only transmit on one channel. As a result, it can be
calculated as follows:∑
a¯n∈An
un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn) =
∑
a¯n∈An
s¯
1 + c(an, a∗Jn)
(23)
Also, the following equation holds for any network topol-
ogy: ∑
a¯n∈An
(
1 + cn(a¯n, a
∗
Jn)
)
= M + |Jn|. (24)
where |Jn| is the number of neighboring users of user n.
From (23) and (24), it follows that
∑
a¯n∈An
un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn) ≥
s¯M2
M + |Jn|
, (25)
where we use the following basic inequality: for ∀xn > 0,∑N
n=1
1
xn
≥ N
2
a
if
∑N
n=1 xn = a. Thus, equation (22) can be
re-written as:
un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥
s¯M
M + |Jn|
. (26)
Finally, it follows that:
U(aNE) =
∑
n∈N
un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥
∑
n∈N
s¯M
M + |Jn|
, (27)
which proves Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 characterizes the lower throughput bound of the
formulated game. Some further discussions are given below:
• If there is only one channel available in the system, i.e.,
M = 1, we have U(aNE) =
∑
a∈N
s¯
1+|Jn|
. In this case,
all users interfere with their neighboring users.
• If the number of channels goes sufficiently large, i.e.,
M → ∞, we have U(aNE) → s¯N . In this case, each
Nash equilibrium is a channel selection profile in which
all the users choosing different channels.
Remark 1. According to Theorem 1 and the properties of
ordinal potential game, it is known that each Nash equilibrium
of the game is also a maximizer of the potential function
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Fig. 1. Schematic of the stochastic-learning-automata-based spectrum access
algorithm for cognitive small cell networks.
Φ(an, a−n). Furthermore, cn(a1, . . . , aN ) can be regarded
as the experienced MAC-layer interference level of user n
and Φ(an, a−n) is the aggregate MAC-layer interference of
all the users [15]. More importantly, it has been shown in
[15] that the MAC-layer interference minimization achieves
satisfactory performance in network throughput. Thus, the
Nash equilibria of the formulated robust graphical game are
expected to achieve high throughput.
C. Stochastic-learning-automata based distributed spectrum
access algorithm
There are large number of learning algorithms for converg-
ing towards stable solutions of ordinal potential games, e.g.,
best response dynamic [19] and spatial adaptive play [13].
Although these algorithms are implemented distributively, they
can not be applied into the considered network due to the fol-
lowing two strict constraints: (i) it needs to know information
of other players including the chosen actions and/or received
payoffs in each iteration, and (ii) they are only suitable for
static environment. In the following, we propose a stochastic
learning algorithm which can converges to desirable solutions
in the dynamic wireless environment.
The proposed learning is based the stochastic learning
automata [21]. Denote qn(k) = {qn1(k), . . . , qnM (k)} as
the mixed strategy of player n in the kth slot. qnm is the
probability of choosing channel m. The stochastic learning
algorithm is described as follows: i) at the beginning of each
slot, the users choose the channels according to their mixed
strategies, ii) all the users access the chosen channels, and
iii) at the end of slot, the users update their mixed strategies
based on the received random transmission rate. Specifically,
the schematic of the proposed learning algorithm is described
in Fig. 1 and the learning procedure is as follows:
Initialization: set k = 0 and set the initial mixed strategy of
each user as qnm(k) = 1M , ∀n ∈ N , ∀m ∈M.
Loop for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
a). Channel selection: at the beginning of the kth slot,
player n randomly selects a channel an(k) according to its
current mixed strategy qn(k).
b). Channel access: all the users access the channels
with the channel selection profile {a1(k), · · · , aN (k)}, and
5they receive the instantaneous transmission rate, which is
determined by (1).
c). Updating mixed strategy: all the users update their
mixed strategies according to the following rules:
qnm(k + 1) = qnm(k) + αnr˜n(k)(1− qnm(k)),m = an(k)
qnm(k + 1) = qnm(k)− αnr˜n(k)qnm(k), m 6= an(k),
(28)
where 0 < αn < 1 is the learning step size of user n. In
addition, r˜n(k) is the normalized received payoff defined as
follows:
r˜n(k) =
rn(k)
smK
, (29)
where smK is the maximum transmission rate of the channels.
End loop
The asymptotical convergence performance of the proposed
learning algorithm is characterized by the following Theorem.
Theorem 3. When the learning step size goes sufficiently
small, i.e., αn → 0, the proposed stochastic learning algorithm
asymptotically converges to a pure strategy NE point of the
formulated robust graphical game F .
Proof: In [21], it has been rigorously proved that the
stochastic learning automata converges to pure strategy NE of
any exact potential game. Ordinal potential games have some
common properties with exact potential games, and the key
difference is as follows: in exact potential games, the change
in the utility function cased by the unilateral action change of
an arbitrary user is the same with that in the potential function,
i.e.,
un(an, aJ−n)− un(a′n, aJn) = φ(an, aJn)− φ(a
′
n, aJn)
(30)
The following relationship is key for the convergence proof
for exact potential games in [21] (See equation (C.40) therein):(
un(an, aJ−n)− un(a′n, aJn)
)(
φ(an, aJn)− φ(a
′
n, aJn)
)
≥ 0
(31)
Note that ordinal potential games also admit the above re-
lationship (See equation (19)). Thus, similar lines for the
proof given in [21] (Theorem 5) can be applied to prove this
theorem. Due to the limited space and to avoid unnecessary
repetition, the detailed proof is omitted.
It is noted that the proposed distributed spectrum access
algorithm is fully completely as it only needs individual
action-payoff information. Furthermore, the update rule, as
characterized by (28), is simple to implement in practice.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Scenario setup
The finite rate channel model is applied to characterize
the time-varying spectrum environment. Specifically, using the
technology of adaptive modulation and coding, the channel
transmission rate is divided into several finite states according
to the received instantaneous signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR). We
consider the HIPERLAN/2 standard [22], in which the channel
rate set is {0, 1, 2, 3, 6}. Note that the rate is defined as the
number of transmitted packets in a slot. We consider Rayleigh
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Fig. 2. A network consisting of fifteen cognitive small cells.
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Fig. 3. The evolution of channel selection probabilities of three arbitrary
chosen SBSs (γ = 5 dB, M = 3, N = 15).
fading in the simulation study. Using the method proposed in
[17], the state probabilities can be obtained for a given average
SNR (γ) and a certain packet error rate (pe). Taking γ = 6
dB and pe = 10−3 as an example, the state probabilities are
given by pi = {0.2791 0.2117 0.2514 0.2566 0.0013}. The
channel state is randomly changing from slot to slot.
In all the simulation study, the interference range between
different SBSs is set to d0 = 300m and the number of channel
is set to M = 3. The step size of the learning algorithm is set
to b = 0.25. The simulation results are obtained by taking the
expected value of 1000 independent trials.
For comparison, we evaluate the throughput performance of
the proposed stochastic learning algorithm, the spatial adaptive
play with neighboring cooperation (SAP-NC) [13] and the
simultaneous log-linear learning algorithm (S-logit) [23]. The
SAP-NC algorithm needs local information exchange among
neighboring users while the S-logit algorithm only needs the
individual action-payoff information. Note they are only suit-
able for static environment. In order to apply these algorithms,
it is assumed that there is an omnipotent genie, which knows
the channel statistics perfectly and regards the time-varying
channels as static channels with fixed transmission rates (the
average transmission rates). Sine both SAP-NC and S-logit
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Fig. 4. The throughput performance comparison when varying the average
received SNR (M = 3, N = 15).
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Fig. 5. The throughput performance comparison for different network scale
(γ = 5 dB and M = 3).
algorithms asymptotically converge to an action profile that
maximizes the potential function of (ordinal) potential games,
it is expected that their performance would be very close to the
optimal solution [13], [23]. However, it should be emphasized
that both SAP-NC and S-logit algorithms actually can not
be applied in the considered time-varying environment. For
presentation, they are called Genie-aided SAP-NC and Genie-
aided S-logit respectively.
To begin with, we consider a network consisting of fifteen
users, as shown in Fig. 2. To study the convergence behav-
ior, the evolution of channel selection probabilities of three
arbitrarily chosen users are shown in Fig. 3. It is noted that
it converges to a pure strategy in about 600 iterations. This
validates the convergence of the proposed learning algorithm
in time-varying environment.
The throughput performance comparison when varying the
average received SNR is shown in Fig. 4. It is noted from
the figure that the performance of the proposed learning
algorithm is very close to those of the Genie-aided SAP-
NC and outperforms the Genie-aided S-logit algorithms. In
addition, the throughput performance comparison for different
network scale is shown in Fig. 5. It is noted from the figure that
the proposed learning algorithm achieves the same throughput
with the Genie-aided SAP-NC algorithm and outperforms the
Genie-aided S-logit algorithm.
To summarize, the simulation results show that the pro-
posed learning algorithm achieves almost the same throughput
performance when compared with existing algorithms. Con-
sidering that both Genie-aided SAP-NC and Genie-aided S-
logit algorithms are for static environment, we claim that the
proposed game-theoretic distributed learning in time-varying
spectrum environment is desirable for small cell networks.
V. CONCLUSION
We investigated the problem of distributed spectrum access
for cognitive small cell networks. Compared with most exist-
ing work, two inherent features are considered: i) the trans-
mission of a cognitive small cell base station only interferes its
neighbors due to the low power, i.e., the interference is local,
and ii) the channel state is time-varying due to fading. We
formulated the problem as a robust graphical game, and proved
that it is an ordinal potential game which has at least one pure
strategy Nash equilibrium (NE). Also, the lower throughput
bound of NE solutions is analytically obtained. We proposed
a distribute spectrum access algorithm to converge to some
stable results. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of
the proposed game-theoretic distributed learning solution in
time-varying spectrum environment.
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